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Abstract
After release from prison or a custodial preventive institu-
tion, offenders may come under supervision in Germany,
which means that their conduct is controlled for a period of
up to five years or even for life by a judicial supervising
authority. Supervision is terminated if it can be expected
that even in the absence of further supervision the released
person will not commit any further offences. From the theo-
retical point of view, supervision is not considered a form of
punishment in Germany, but a preventive measure that is
guided by the principle of proportionality. After a presenta-
tion of the German twin track system of criminal sanctions
and a glimpse at sentencing theory, the capacity of the prin-
ciple of proportionality to guide and control judicial deci-
sions in the field of preventive sanctions is discussed. The
human rights perspective plays only a minor role in the con-
text of supervision in Germany.
Keywords: Supervision, twin track system, principle of pro-
portionality, human rights, violent and sex offenders
1 Introduction
1.1 Political Background
The general attitude towards violent and sex offenders
changed in Germany in the second half of the 1990s.
The reasons were multifaceted, but of major importance
was the media coverage of several sexual offences
against young girls in the mid-1990s. There was the
much talked about case of Marc Dutroux, who kidnap-
ped, raped and killed teenage girls in Belgium. In Ger-
many, there was the case of a seven-year-old girl who
was abused and murdered by a patient during day
release in the vicinity of a mental hospital in 1994.
There were the murders of two girls in 1996 and 1997 in
Bavaria and Lower Saxony who were sexually abused
and killed by ex-convicts after their release from a prior
* Prof. Dr. Bernd-Dieter Meier is the Chair in Criminal Law and Criminol-
ogy at the Law Faculty of Leibniz University Hannover. This article is
part of a comparative research project involving several European juris-
dictions, of which the results are presented in this special issue. For fur-
ther background of the theme and outline of the issue and individual
articles, as well as the comparative analysis, see the contribution by Van
der Wolf in this issue.
prison sentence. The call for harsher sentences for ‘dan-
gerous’ sex offenders grew louder and exerted consider-
able pressure on the German legislature, the judiciary,
and the authorities of prisons and mental hospitals.
Parliament reacted in 1998 by the enactment of a law
that brought remarkable changes to the German system
of criminal sanctions.1 The system as a whole still dated
from a reform period in the late 1960s and had under-
gone the lapse of time without major interventions by
public policy. The new law tightened the requirements
for conditional release from prison and other custodial
institutions by accentuating the necessity to consider
public security interests. It became obligatory to obtain
the opinion of a psychiatrist before a long-term sentence
or a custodial preventive measure could be suspended.
Directions to undergo medical treatment were allowed
without the prior consent of the convicted person as
long as he was not of an invasive nature or treatment for
addiction, which meant that a convicted person could be
compelled to go to psychotherapeutic treatment after his
release. The scope of post-release supervision was wid-
ened; it was imposed by law on sex offenders having
served a full sentence of more than one year in prison,
whereas the law stipulated at the same time that other
offenders must have served more than two years to trig-
ger supervision after release. The courts were allowed to
impose indeterminate supervision, if the offender did
not consent to or comply with a medical treatment or an
addiction treatment direction. Last but not least, the
scope of preventive detention, in place since the 1930s,
was widened by reducing the formal requirements for
its imposition if an offender had been convicted of a fel-
ony (minimum prison sentence of one year), a sex
offence or a qualified offence against the person.
The general attitude was not softened by these changes,
fear of crime and the willingness to inflict punishment
on dangerous offenders, namely sex offenders, remained
on a high level. Although international comparisons
showed that public opinion in Germany differed consid-
erably from that in other countries, especially England
and Wales and the USA, in that the approval rate of the
public for imprisonment was still remarkably lower in
1. Act to combat sexual offences and other dangerous offences of 26 Jan-
uary 1998, Federal Law Gazette I page 160; the act is commented by
H. Schöch, ‘Das Gesetz zur Bekämpfung von Sexualdelikten und ander-
en gefährlichen Straftaten vom 26.1.1998’, 51 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 1257 (1998).
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Germany than in other countries,2 the general attitude
could not be ignored by German policy makers. Not
only the conservatives who had authored the law of
1998, but also the social democrats who were in power
1998-2005 stood for a rigid course on dangerous and sex
offenders. In 2001, Chancellor Schröder publicly articu-
lated what many people deemed necessary: ‘Lock them
away, forever’.3 As a consequence, the first decade of
the new century saw a continued shifting in the system
of criminal sanctions with a further tightening of the
restrictions on dangerous and sex offenders. Again and
again, the scope of preventive detention was extended.
The limitation of ten years for the first-time detainees
was abolished retroactively, new forms of deferred and
subsequent detention were introduced, and unlimited
preventive detention was allowed for young adults and
even for juveniles.4 In addition, but without reference to
specific incidents or cases, the provisions of supervision
were enhanced and adapted to new security require-
ments in 2007.5 Core elements of the Act of 2007 were
the extension and fortification of the directions that may
be imposed on a convicted offender after release as well
as the further extension of the scope of indeterminate
supervision. New directions were the order to present
himself at certain times to a doctor, a psychotherapist or
a forensic ambulance service, and the order to undergo
psychiatric, psycho- or socio-therapy. Indeterminate
supervision was additionally allowed for offenders, espe-
cially sex offenders, who violated directions, if this gave
reason to believe that there was a danger to the general
public by the commission of further serious offences.
The year 2009 brought a turning point. On 17 Decem-
ber 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ruled
that the 1998 retrospective extension of preventive
detention to an unlimited period of time had been
incompatible with the right not to have a heavier penalty
imposed than the one applicable at the time of the
offence (Art. 7 ECHR).6 On 13 January 2011, the Court
confirmed that judgement and held that the subsequent
order of preventive detention did not have the necessary
causal connection between the conviction and the depri-
vation of liberty at issue, and therefore violated the
detainee’s right to liberty and freedom (Art. 5 ECHR).7
On 4 May 2011, the German Federal Constitutional
2. J. van Dijk, J. van Kesteren & P. Smit, Criminal Victimisation in Interna-
tional Perspective. Key Findings from 2004 – 2005 ICVS and EU ICS
(2007), at 147; K.-H. Reuband, ‘Steigende Repressionsneigung im Zei-
talter der “Postmoderne”?’, 15 Neue Kriminalpolitik 100 (2003); K.-H.
Reuband, ‘Steigende Punitivität oder stabile Sanktionsorientierungen
der Bundesbürger? Das Strafverlangen auf der Deliktebene im Zeitver-
gleich’, 21 Soziale Probleme 97 (2010).
3. E.C. Rautenberg, ‘Wegschließen für immer!?’, 54 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 2608 (2001).
4. J. Kinzig, Die Legalbewährung gefährlicher Rückfalltäter. Zugleich ein
Betrag zur Entwicklung des Rechts der Sicherungsverwahrung (2008),
at 9.
5. Act to reform supervision and to revise the provisions on subsequent
preventive detention of 13 April 2007, Federal Law Gazette I page 513,
with commentary by U. Schneider, ‘Die Reform der Führungsaufsicht’,
27 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 441 (2007).
6. ECtHR, M. v. Germany, Applic. No. 19359/04.
7. ECtHR, Haidn v. Germany, Applic. No. 6587/04.
Court abandoned earlier judgements and found that
there was no enough distance between the execution of a
prison sentence and the execution of preventive deten-
tion, i.e. sentences and preventive detention were execu-
ted in similar settings and under similar conditions (e.g.
in similar-sized cells). Therefore, all legal provisions of
the imposition and duration of preventive detention
were declared incompatible with the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the German constitution, the so-called
Basic Law.8 Consequently, two new laws were enacted
in 2010 and 2012, by which the requirements for the
imposition and execution of preventive detention were
redesigned. The first was a reaction to the 2009 decision
of the European Court of Human rights; it practically
abolished the subsequent order of preventive detention.9
The second was a reaction to the 2011 decision of the
Federal Constitutional Court; it determined that the
execution of preventive detention and the antecedent
imprisonment have to aim at the minimisation of the
offender’s dangerousness and offer enough measures for
an open, liberty-oriented detention regime.10 Since
then, the general debate on the proper handling of dan-
gerous offenders has become less agitated and fearful in
Germany. Public opinion seems to have eased off for a
while, at last.
1.2 Supervision in the Twin Track System
Before going into the details of the indeterminate con-
trol of sex offenders in the community, it should be
noted that the German system of criminal sanctions is a
twin track system like in many other countries on the
European continent. ‘Twin track’ means that the diver-
gent functions of criminal sanctions are separated in the
sentencing process and assigned to either the retributive
track of penalties (imprisonment and fines), or the pre-
ventive track of custodial or non-custodial measures
(‘measures of rehabilitation and security’). Entry
requirement for the first track is the offender’s legal
responsibility, and that for the second is the likelihood
of further offenses, which may be considered a synonym
for the offender’s ‘dangerousness’. An offender who is
convicted for drink-driving, for instance, is fined (pun-
ishment) and additionally disqualified from driving if
necessary (a preventive measure) in Germany. A men-
tally ill or an addicted offender may receive a prison
sentence and be additionally sent to a mental hospital or
custodial addiction treatment, the time spent in custody
for the latter credited against the sentence. A violent or
a sex offender, to mention a third example, who is con-
sidered a danger to the general public, because the court
finds a high risk of further serious offences resulting in
serious emotional trauma or physical injury to the vic-
tim, has to serve the sentence of imprisonment first and
is placed in preventive detention afterwards until the
8. Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 4 May 2011, 2 BvR 2365/09.
9. Act to reorder the provisions on preventive detention of 22 December
2010, Federal Law Gazette I page 2300.
10. Act to implement the imperative of distance in the provisions on pre-
ventive detention of 5 December 2012, Federal Law Gazette I page
2425.
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preventive measure is suspended or terminated. The
advantage of the twin track system is seen in the effect
that the penalties do not necessarily have to serve pre-
ventive needs. Because it is usually only a small group of
offenders who show specific preventive needs, the con-
sequence of the twin track system is that the general lev-
el of punishment can be kept at a rather moderate level
(in Germany, the prison population rate per 100,000
population was 84.1 in 2013).11 It is generally not
assumed that the rate of recidivism, which appears to be
quite high in Germany (46.2% of the persons released
from imprisonment in 2007 were reconvicted after three
years12), can effectively be reduced just by longer or
harsher sentences.
In the German twin track system of criminal sanctions,
there are two differing forms of non-custodial control of
offenders: probation and supervision. Probation is a part
of the retributive, penalty track and dependent on the
suspension of a prison sentence. In Germany, sentences
not exceeding two years may be suspended if there are
reasons to believe that the convicted offender will not
commit further offences. The normative assumption is
that, in these cases, the preventive needs are better met
by avoiding the offender’s imprisonment. In the same
way, the court may grant conditional early release from
a prison sentence if the release is appropriate consider-
ing public security interests, i.e. if, again, it can be
expected that the convicted person will not commit fur-
ther offences. The basic requirement for probation is
thus a low risk of reoffending, the courts having to be
convinced that the offender will observe the directions,
follow the guidance of a probation officer and not disap-
point the expectation that no further offences are com-
mitted. The operational period may not exceed five
years, an indeterminate control is not possible.
Supervision, on the other hand, is a non-custodial pre-
ventive measure of rehabilitation and security. Either it
may be imposed by the courts, which is not relevant in
practice (less than hundred cases per year13), or it
emerges as the automatic consequence of the termina-
tion of a prison sentence or the suspension or termina-
tion of a custodial preventive measure (mental hospital,
addiction treatment, preventive detention). The risks of
further offences are varied in these cases. The risk is low
if a custodial measure is suspended (because the suspen-
sion is bound by law to a low risk of re-offending,
according to sec. 67d(2) German Criminal Code the
offender must be expected not to commit any more
unlawful acts if released). It is high if the offender had
11. Council of Europe, Annual Penal Statistics. Space I – Prison Popula-
tions. Survey 2013 (2014), at 42.
12. J.-M. Jehle, H.-J. Albrecht, S. Hohmann-Fricke & C. Tetal, Legalbewäh-
rung nach strafrechtlichen Sanktionen. Eine bundesweite Rückfallunter-
suchung 2007 bis 2010 und 2004 bis 2010 (2013), at 36, available at:
<www. bmjv. de/ DE/ Ministerium/ Fachthemen/ AbtII/ IIA7/
Rueckfallstatistik_ doc. html ?nn= 1468684> (last visited 12 August 2015).
An overview of recidivism studies in various European countries is given
on the Internet: <http:// wp. unil. ch/ space/ publications/ recidivism -
studies/ 27/> (last visited 19 April 2016).
13. Statistisches Bundesamt, Rechtspflege. Strafverfolgung (2013), table
5.5.
to serve a full prison sentence or if a measure is termina-
ted because the maximum period has expired (addiction
treatment, two years) or because the continued enforce-
ment of the measure would be disproportionate; if it
were low, the offender would have been released earlier.
During supervision, the released person is under the
guidance and control of a supervising authority, a pro-
bation officer, forensic ambulance services, the courts
and in some cases the police.14 The offender’s conduct
is structured and influenced by directions imposed by
the courts. The period of supervision may last between
two and five years, or may be indeterminate. In all of
these cases, supervision is terminated if the court
expects that the convicted person will, even in the
absence of further supervision, not commit any further
offences.
It is because of the last mentioned indeterminate, poten-
tially life-long control that supervision is considered the
most intrusive community measure of German law. In
spite of its substantial theoretical significance, however,
there are no official statistics on the frequency of super-
vision in Germany. The only data available stem from
an unofficial gathering organised by Deutsche Bewäh-
rungshilfe e.V., a professional association for probation
officers. This data collection indicates that there has
been a considerable increase in supervision cases from
24,800 in 2008 to 36,700 in 2014 (+47.9%).15 The rea-
sons for the rise are unknown, but it can be assumed
that there is a connection with the development of men-
tal hospital and custodial addiction treatment orders,
which has also seen a considerable increase in the past
two decades.16
2 Indeterminate Supervision in
the Light of Sentencing
Theory
In Germany, the origins of the twin track system date
back to the scholarly discussions of the late nineteenth/
early twentieth century on the justification of punish-
ment. Two conceptions competed, the conception of
punishment as retribution for a crime committed in the
past (classical school, in Germany tied to the name of
Karl Binding, 1841-1920) and the conception of punish-
ment as a means to prevent future crimes (modern
school, propagated by Franz von Liszt, 1851-1919).17
The result of the dispute was a compromise, which took
suggestions of the Swiss professor Carl Stooss
(1849-1934) and split the differing functions of punish-
14. B.-D. Meier, Strafrechtliche Sanktionen, 4th edn (2015), at 296-301.
15. See <www. dbh -online. de/ fa/> (last visited 31 July 2015).
16. M.P. Rohrbach, ‘Die Verschärfung der Führungsaufsicht’, 97 Monatss-
chrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform 248 (2014); see also C.
Morgenstern, A. Hecht, ‘Rechtstatsachen zur Führungsaufsicht im kri-
minalpolitischen Kontext’, 58 Bewährungshilfe 186 (2011).
17. T. Vormbaum, Einführung in die moderne Strafrechtsgeschichte, 2nd
edn (2011), at 137.
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ment into the two systematically different tracks of pen-
alties and measures. The first draft law based on this
compromise was published as early as 1909,18 but it was
only a quarter of a century later that the new twin track
system was formally enacted in 1933.19 Since then, the
existence of the twin track system has become an inte-
gral and undisputed part of criminal law in Germany.
In the German twin track system, retributive penalties
are justified by looking back to the committed offence.
The offender is punished because he has committed a
crime, no further justification needed. At bottom, pun-
ishment is retaliation. It is a necessary means to the
restoration of justice because, in retributive thinking,
the wrong committed by the offender can only be
evened out by the infliction of a suffering on him, a con-
sideration unfolded by German idealism, mainly by
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). In today’s German crimi-
nal law theory, however, it is not the wrong of the
offence that is counterbalanced by the sentence but
rather the offender’s guilt, i.e. his personal responsibili-
ty for the violation of law. An offender may only be
punished if when committing the crime he was aware
that he was acting unlawfully, he was capable to appreci-
ate the unlawfulness of his actions and act accordingly,
and it could reasonably be expected from him to abide
by the law because he was not in a situation of duress.
Guilt is, in other words, the blameworthiness of the
offender for not using his capacity to abide by the law.20
In sentencing theory, these considerations legitimising
the right to punish are transferred to the determination
of the severity of the sentence for a given offence. All
aspects that can be related to the offence are evaluated in
the light of guilt, which includes not only the offence
itself but also the pre- and post-offence behaviour (earli-
er sentences, confession, redress, etc.).21 It is in this
sense the notion of guilt has to be understood if German
law stipulates in sec. 46(1) Criminal Code: ‘The guilt of
the offender is the basis for sentencing’. The popular
saying that punishment should fit the crime thus does
not apply in German law. Punishment is rather con-
strued as a function of guilt. The concept of guilt does
not imply that preventive aspects from deterrence to
rehabilitation are completely irrelevant in the retributive
track of punishment. They are not of major importance,
though, and may only be considered in the range
defined by the severity of offender’s individual guilt. A
convicted person may therefore not be sent to prison for
a longer period of time than required by the degree of
his guilt, even if security reasons require the placement
in a mental hospital or preventive detention
afterwards.22 As supervision, on the other hand, is not
18. Reichsjustizamt, Vorentwurf zu einem Deutschen Strafgesetzbuch.
Begründung. Allgemeiner Teil (1909), at 147.
19. Act against dangerous habitual offenders and on measures of security
and rehabilitation of 24 November 1933, Imperial Law Gazette I page
995.
20. Federal Court of Justice, 18 March 1952, GSSt 2/51.
21. Meier, above n. 14, at 192; see also F. Streng, Strafrechtliche Sanktio-
nen, 3rd edn (2012), at 255.
22. Federal Court of Justice, 4 August 1965, 2 StR 282/65.
considered a form of punishment but a preventive meas-
ure, it may be inflicted without regard to the offender’s
severity of guilt.
The theoretical justification of the preventive track of
custodial and non-custodial measures is less clear. Most
authors identify a utilitarian principle of predominant
public interest that legitimises any form of intervention
into the private sphere as long as the safeguards of pro-
portionality are observed.23 In the case of preventive
criminal sanctions, the principle of predominant public
interest emerges as a means to protect the public against
the danger of further offences. The offence committed
in the past provides the motivation, but not the justifica-
tion for the offender’s conviction and the imposition
and execution of sanctions; the justification is derived
solely from the risk of future offences and the imminent
danger for public security. The principle of predomi-
nant public interest is, however, strictly bound to the
proportionality of the sanction. As sec. 62 of the Ger-
man Criminal Code states: ‘A measure of rehabilitation
and incapacitation must not be ordered if its use is dis-
proportionate to the seriousness of the offence commit-
ted by or expected to be committed by the convicted
person and to the degree of danger he poses to society’.
As sec. 62 applies to all forms of preventive measures in
German law, supervision is likewise bound to the prin-
ciple of proportionality. Supervision may only be
imposed and executed if and as long as it is necessary to
achieve its aim of public protection.
In the focus of all preventive measures is the concept of
danger, i.e. the prospect that further offences will be
committed. Under the principle of proportionality,
‘danger’ must be understood as a dynamic concept,
which needs to be adapted to the depth of intrusion into
the private sphere going along with the different forms
of preventive measures. Custodial measures may, for
instance, be justified only with a greater degree of ‘dan-
ger’ than non-custodial measures, an indeterminate
mental hospital order requires a greater degree of dan-
ger than a custodial addiction treatment order, which is
limited to two years in German law.24 Similar consider-
ations apply to different embodiments of supervision.
The more intensive forms, particularly indeterminate
supervision or its combination with specific directions
such as electronic monitoring, require a greater degree
of danger than minor forms that may be less intrusive.
The ‘degree of danger’ addressed in sec. 62 German
Criminal Code can, at least in theory, be related to the
likelihood as well as to the seriousness of the future
offences; the more serious the expected offences are, the
lower the likelihood by which they are expected may be,
and vice versa. Nearness of the expected offences and
the validity of the instruments used for risk assessment
23. W. Frisch, ‘Die Maßregeln der Besserung und Sicherung im strafrechtli-
chen Rechtsfolgensystem’, 102 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechts-
wissenschaft 369, at 382 (1990); G. Kaiser, Befinden sich die kriminal-
rechtlichen Maßregeln in der Krise? (1990), at 12; see also Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany, 4 May 2011, 2 BvR 2365/09.
24. A. Dessecker, Gefährlichkeit und Verhältnismäßigkeit. Eine Untersu-
chung zum Maßregelrecht (2004), at 132.
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may be seen as additional aspects that may be taken into
account. Proper judgements on the ‘danger’ a convicted
person poses to society are thus quite a difficult task and
sometimes hard to achieve in practice.25 Whenever a
court feels that it lacks the necessary empirical knowl-
edge, expert opinion must be heard.
Supervision is construed as a preventive measure that is
imposed and executed under criminal law in Germany.
It is justified by the predominant interest in public
security and is bound to the principle of proportionality,
the hardship going along with its imposition or execu-
tion being acceptable, provided that it is proportionate
to the degree of danger attributed to the offender. Inde-
terminate supervision is no exception. According to sec.
68c(2) German Criminal Code, indeterminate supervi-
sion is permitted, if the convicted person does not con-
sent to or comply with a medical treatment or an addic-
tion treatment direction and ‘a danger to the general
public through the commission of further serious offen-
ces is to be expected’ (introduced in 1998). According to
sec. 68c(3), indeterminate supervision is permitted, if in
the case of a suspended mental hospital order there is
reason to believe that the convicted person is otherwise
about to lapse into a state of mental incapacity or if a
violent or a sex offender violates directions imposed on
him by the court or ‘other specific circumstances give
reason to believe that there may be a danger to the gen-
eral public by the commission of further serious offen-
ces’ (introduced in 2007). As indeterminate supervision
results in a substantial, potentially life-long restriction
of the offender’s liberty, the legal provisions have to be
applied carefully and restrictively by the courts.26
There is, of course, more academic debate on sentencing
theory, the principles of sentencing, the theoretical jus-
tification of the preventive measures, and the concepts
of danger and proportionality than has been outlined
here. The concept of personal guilt has been challenged
by authors who recommend the replacement by a sen-
tencing system that is solely built on the severity of the
offence and the concept of harm, thus unburdening the
present system of the necessity to consider highly indi-
vidualised aspects of personal guilt and preventive
needs.27 Moreover, it has been pointed out that the con-
cept of danger, which underlies all preventive measures,
requires reliable forensic prediction methods indepen-
dent of judgemental discretion, which are difficult to
achieve in practice; the suggestion has been that the
empirical foundation of the preventive measures should
be replaced by a normative system of a fair distribution
25. Ibid., at 187.
26. Marburg Regional Court, 13 January 2014, 11 StVK 9/14; K.-H. Groß,
Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 2nd edn (2012), sec. 68c
n. 7; J. Kinzig, Schönke/Schröder. Strafgesetzbuch. Kommentar, 29th
edn (2014), sec. 68c n. 2.
27. T. Hörnle, Tatproportionale Strafzumessung (1999); T. Hörnle, ‘Das
antiquierte Schuldverständnis der traditionellen Strafzumessungsrecht-
sprechung und –lehre’, 54 Juristenzeitung 1080 (1999); but see also
Streng, above n. 21, at 314-17.
of risks.28 All of these approaches, however, have not
been taken up by the legislature or the judiciary; their
influence has been limited to academic circles. Never-
theless, in the past few years, it could be observed that
there has been a new, increased awareness of the meth-
odological problems of prediction methods throughout
the courts and the forensic institutions.
3 Indeterminate Supervision
and the Principle of
Proportionality
3.1 Law in Books
In German law, the principle of proportionality consists
of four elements: there must be an aim for the measure
legitimate under Basic Law, the measure must be suita-
ble to achieve the aim, the measure must be necessary to
achieve the aim, i.e. the aim cannot be reached by less
intrusive means, and considering the competing inter-
ests the measure must be adequate.29 In the context of
supervision, the first of these elements is not questiona-
ble. It is generally acknowledged that the protection of
the public is an objective that may legitimately be pur-
sued by the state. Averting dangers to protect the public
is in Germany considered one of the main functions of
the state, which may even be derived from the funda-
mental rights guaranteed by the constitution. According
to the German Federal Constitutional Court, the basic
rights do not only constitute a defence against the state,
but they also establish claims, i.e. in the case of criminal
law, the claim to receive protection against unlawful
attacks.30
The second element, suitability, depends on how the
measure of supervision is organised. It is obvious that
the public protection provided by a non-custodial meas-
ure differs from the protection granted by custodial
measures such as preventive detention or imprisonment.
Nevertheless, supervision is not a totally inept (and
therefore disproportionate) means to prevent the con-
victed person from re-offending. German law uses a
twofold approach for the execution of supervision,
which is a combination of control and support. Most
powerful is the supervising authority, a branch of the
general administration of justice that has the task to con-
trol the conduct of the convicted person and the fulfil-
28. Streng, above n. 21, at 166-67; W. Frisch, ‘Defizite empirischen Wis-
sens und ihre Bewältigung im Strafrecht’, in R. Bloy, M. Böse, T. Hillen-
kamp, C. Momsen & P. Rackow (eds.), Gerechte Strafe und legitimes
Strafrecht. Festschrift für Manfred Maiwald (2010), 239 at 252; W.
Frisch, Prognoseentscheidungen im Strafrecht. Zur normativen Relevanz
empirischen Wissens und zur Entscheidung bei Nichtwissen (1983), at
53-55, 161-70.
29. J. Kaspar, Verhältnismäßigkeit und Grundrechtsschutz im Präventions-
strafrecht (2014), at 101; Dessecker, above n. 24, at 343.
30. Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 25 February 1975, 1 BvF
1/74; 29 May 1993, 2 BvF 2/90; K. Stern, ‘Die Schutzpflichtenfunktion
der Grundrechte: Eine juristische Entdeckung’, 63 Die öffentliche Ver-
waltung 241 (2010); V. Epping, Grundrechte, 6th edn (2015), at 59.
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ment of the directions imposed upon him by the court.31
If the convicted person does not comply with the direc-
tions, the supervising authority informs the court and
has the right to file a request for prosecution because
non-compliance with court orders constitutes a new
offence in Germany punishable with up to three years of
imprisonment (sec. 145a German Criminal Code).
Social support, on the other hand, comes from a proba-
tion officer who is assigned by the court. The probation
officer has the task to offer assistance and care according
to social work standards. Their work is supplemented
by forensic ambulance services, which were introduced
in 2007. If the court imposed a therapy direction, i.e. a
direction to undergo psychiatric, psycho- or socio-ther-
apy, the forensic ambulance services offer these options
to the offender. The three institutions (supervising
authority, probation officer and forensic ambulance
service) are by law obliged to work together and disclose
secrets to each other (sec. 68a German Criminal Code).
In the case of sex offenders released from prison or cus-
todial preventive measures, the cooperation of the three
institutions is additionally reinforced by the police.
Since 2006, all German states have developed special
programmes for the supervision of this particular group
of offenders. The common feature of these programmes
is that all sex offenders undergo individual risk assess-
ments in round-table conferences chaired by the police.
In these conferences, the risk is categorised, and the
measures considered necessary and appropriate to pre-
vent the convicted sex-offenders from re-offending are
determined individually.32 Although the effectiveness of
these programmes or of supervision as a whole has not
yet been evaluated empirically in Germany, it can safely
be assumed that the measures help to reduce the risk of
further offending and thus make a contribution to pub-
lic protection. The measure of supervision is, in other
words, not unsuitable to reach its aim.
The third element of proportionality, necessity, is
dependent on the existence of less intrusive means to
achieve the aim of public protection. In the German
legal system, these less intrusive means can only come
from the police laws, i.e. from the laws addressing safety
and security needs and requirements. In this context, it
is necessary to understand that in the German legal sys-
tem, the position of the police is based on two founda-
tions: criminal law and security law as part of adminis-
trative law. If police activities result from a criminal
offence committed in the past, the legal basis is criminal
law; in all other cases it is security law.33 Most preven-
tive measures imposable under criminal law can be
31. A. Dessecker, ‘Von der Polizeiaufsicht zur Führungsaufsicht und
zurück?’, in E. Hilgendorf and R. Rengier (eds.), Festschrift für Wolf-
gang Heinz (2012) 631, at 634.
32. D. Ruderich, Führungsaufsicht (2014), at 245; S. Thomaßen, ‘Konzep-
tion zum Umgang mit rückfallgefährdeten Sexualstraftätern (KURS
NRW)’, 6 Forensische Psychiatrie, Psychologie, Kriminologie 25 (2012);
M.P. Rohrbach, Die Entwicklung der Führungsaufsicht unter besonderer
Berücksichtigung der Praxis in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (2014), at
152; Rohrbach, above n. 16, at 257.
33. F. Schoch, ‘Doppelfunktionale Maßnahmen der Polizei’, 35 Juristische
Ausbildung 1115 (2013).
imposed under the security laws as well if a danger for
public security is expected. Football hooligans, for
instance, which may not have committed a criminal
offence in the past, may nevertheless be registered, cate-
gorised, addressed and supervised according to the
security laws if the police expects a danger for public
security, especially if they expect the commission of an
offence.34 Under specific circumstances, even arrest and
detention of a hooligan may be justified and are compat-
ible with European law.35 Police activities based on the
security laws can thus not necessarily be considered less
intrusive than activities based on criminal law, although
they are bound to a different, more restrictive degree of
‘danger’: the police laws stipulate that the danger must
be ‘concrete’, i.e. it must be sufficiently probable that
public security will be affected by some damaging event.
The preventive measure of supervision under criminal
law, on the other hand, is only bound to the ‘danger that
the (convicted) person will commit further offences’
(sec. 68(1) German Criminal Code), which appears to be
a more general concept. The differences, however, are
marginal. The criminal courts are by law obliged to ter-
minate supervision, ‘if it can be expected that even in
the absence of further supervision the person will not
commit any further offences’ (sec. 68e(2) German
Criminal Code). It is therefore hardly possible to claim
that supervision based on criminal law is disproportion-
ate because public security measures under police law
are less intrusive.
The last element of proportionality, adequacy, compares
the different interests at hand. The hardship imposed
upon the individual must be appropriate to the gains
reached for the public. It is in this context that the
intensity in type and duration of the particular form of
supervision (e.g. its indeterminate length) must be
weighted and balanced against the likelihood and the
seriousness of further offences that the convicted person
is expected to commit in the absence of supervision, and
the imposition of supervision is expected to avert. The
seriousness of the offence(s) committed in the past,
which is also mentioned in sec. 62 German Criminal
Code as an element of the evaluation, is in this context
only of minor importance because supervision is typical-
ly only imposed if the offence(s) committed in the past
may be considered as ‘serious’; whether imposed by
court or executed as an automatic consequence of the
judgement, supervision becomes operational only in
conjunction with custodial sanctions, not with fines or
other non-custodial consequences of the committed
offence. Provided that the degree of danger that is nec-
essary for the imposition of supervision (notably the
seriousness and the likelihood of the future offences)
can be established in the particular case, the proportion-
ality test thus requires that the depth of intrusion into
the offender’s private sphere is elaborated and weighted.
34. T. Siegel, ‘Hooligans im Verwaltungsrecht. Stadionverbote und andere
polizeirechtliche Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung von Gewalt in Fußball-
stadien’, 66 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1035 (2013).
35. ECHR, Ostendorf v. Germany, Applic. No. 15598/08.
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This can hardly be done in a general way because in
practice supervision may be executed in a variety of
forms emphasising either the aspects of social support
and reintegration or the aspects of guidance and control.
For a legal discussion, however, it is sufficient to know
that supervision is established by law as a flexible instru-
ment that can and must be adapted to the convicted per-
son’s individual developments after release.36 All deci-
sions on the particular execution of supervision can sub-
sequently be reviewed, modified or vacated by the
courts (sec. 68d(1) German Criminal Code), the maxi-
mum duration may be reduced and the measure may be
terminated (sec. 68c(1) and 68e(2) German Criminal
Code). All subsequent decisions are subject to legal
review (sec. 463(2) German Code of Criminal Proce-
dure). The flexibility and adaptability of the law thus
preclude (at least in theory) a situation in which super-
vision may be considered a hardship for the offender not
in balance with the gains reached for public security.
From a theoretical point of view, supervision, and even
indeterminate supervision, is consistent with the princi-
ple of proportionality.37
3.2 Law in Action
The obvious question is how the theoretical concept of
proportionality is applied in practice, i.e. whether the
imposition and execution of supervision are applied in a
way that is suitable, necessary and adequate to achieve
the aim of public protection. Empirical data are available
from a study conducted by a research team headed by
German criminologists Jörg Kinzig and Alexander Baur
from Tübingen University. The study is based on the
examination of 606 records of supervision cases and the
questioning of over 900 professionals in the field of
supervision; it can be considered representative for the
situation in Germany.38
Kinzig and Baur differentiate between three types of
supervision: supervision after suspension of a custodial
preventive measure (type I, low risk), supervision after
termination of a custodial preventive measure (type II,
which is a combination of different subgroups, high
risk) and supervision after having served a full prison
sentence (type III, high risk). In all of these cases,
supervision is imposed by law and the courts’ decisions
are restricted to the execution of the measure. The judi-
cial decisions on the execution include assignment of the
supervising authority and appointment of a probation
officer, imposition of directions, determination of the
period of supervision and subsequent decisions. With
respect to the principle of proportionality, the determi-
nation of the duration of supervision is most interesting.
Although the law provides that the period may be fixed
between two and five years, five years being the preset
duration, if the courts make no decision (sec. 68c Ger-
36. H. Schneider, Strafgesetzbuch. Leipziger Kommentar, 12th edn (2008),
sec. 68d n. 6.
37. For determinate supervision, see Federal Constitutional Court of Germa-
ny, 15 August 1980, 2 BvR 495/80.
38. A. Baur and J. Kinzig (eds.), Die reformierte Führungsaufsicht (2015).
man Criminal Code),39 in practice the courts are reluc-
tant to exert the discretion granted by law and in most
cases stick to the maximum duration of five years
instead. In the Kinzig and Baur study, the period was
held at five years in 64.6% of the type I cases, 65.5% of
the type II cases and 81.2% of the type III cases, where-
as the minimum of two years was fixed only in 0.8%,
4.3% and 2.0% of the three groups, respectively.40 This
distribution is noticeable because it differs from the dis-
tribution that might be expected if probability calcula-
tion was applied; especially in the type I group of low-
risk offenders, one might expect a remarkably lower
percentage of maximum periods. Even if Kinzig and
Baur also found that life-long supervision is in practice
very rare,41 the distribution thus signals that the majori-
ty of the courts act risk oriented and cautious in Germa-
ny, showing less interest in the offenders’ liberty rights
than in the idea of public security. Apart from that, the
theoretical option to revise the one-sided distribution by
subsequent decisions (sec. 68d German Criminal Code)
is in practice made use of only in a small number of
cases.
In light of these findings, the question arises, what is
known about the ‘real’ rate of further offences commit-
ted by convicted persons under supervision? The effort
to give an empirically validated answer is confronted
with a series of methodological problems. Nevertheless,
there is an analysis of the national register of criminal
convictions conducted under the guidance of German
criminologists Jörg-Martin Jehle and Hans-Jörg
Albrecht. The study analysed inter alia the reconviction
rates of all persons who had either been convicted and
received a non-custodial sanction by German courts in
2007, or been released from imprisonment or a custodial
preventive measure in 2007; in both cases the period
under observation was three years. Directly comparable
to the Kinzig/Baur study are only the results concern-
ing convicted persons with a full prison sentence (type
III supervision in the Kinzig and Baur study). Jehle and
Albrecht found that, in this group, 40.4% of the persons
released from prison re-offended within the observation
period of three years. Other than in the Kinzig/Baur
study in which the authors differentiated between sus-
pension and termination of a custodial measure (type I
and II), Jehle and Albrecht differentiated between
offenders who had been sanctioned with an isolated cus-
todial measure and offenders who had received the
measure as an addendum to a retributive punishment
(i.e. a combination of retributive and preventive punish-
ment). In the first case, the reconviction rates were con-
siderably lower (5.0% after release from mental hospi-
tal, 24.2% after release from custodial addiction treat-
ment) than those in the second case (23.2% after mental
hospital, 41.9% after addiction treatment, 39.4% after
39. Dresden Higher Regional Court, 12 December 2008, 2 Ws 380/08; H.
Ostendorf, Nomos Kommentar Strafgesetzbuch, 4th edn (2013), sec.
68c n. 5; but see also Berlin Higher Regional Court, 20 June 2011, 2 Ws
159/11.
40. Baur and Kinzig, above n. 38, at 533.
41. Ibid., at 538 and 543.
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preventive detention).42 The reconviction rates in the
Jehle and Albrecht study, however, include all kinds of
convictions (offences similar to the earlier offences or
not) and all kinds of sanctions (custodial and non-custo-
dial); they may therefore not necessarily be interpreted
as indicators of a general ‘dangerousness’ of the convic-
ted persons under supervision. Reconvictions because of
serious offences similar to the first offence are not as fre-
quent as a misreading of the Jehle and Albrecht figures
might suggest.
Empirical data, in the contrary, suggest that the likeli-
hood of further offences is overestimated in judicial
practice. In Germany, several studies have been conduc-
ted on the development of convicted persons’ criminal
behaviour after release. The examined persons either
could not be sent to preventive detention or had to be
released from preventive detention for formal reasons,
although the judicial authorities were convinced that the
persons in question were ‘dangerous’, i.e. although they
exhibited a high risk of committing further serious vio-
lent or sex offences. A study by Jürgen L. Müller et al.
found that of all offenders officially considered as ‘dan-
gerous’ (n = 25), 60% re-offended in an observation
period of two years. Only in 28% of the cases, however,
the authors classified the re-offence as ‘serious’, because
the offender received an unsuspended prison sentence
of more than eighteen months, while 32% of the cases
were considered ‘minor’.43 Similar results were shown
in a study by Michael Alex from Bochum University. In
his study, Alex examined a sample of 121 high-risk
offenders who had to be released from prison, after they
had served their full sentence, although the public pros-
ecutor still considered them dangerous. In this group,
Alex found a rate of 52% of ex-inmates re-convicted
after an observation period of at least forty-eight
months. In more than half of the cases (29.8%), the re-
offence was considered ‘serious’, because the offenders
were sanctioned with unsuspended prison sentence,
while in the rest of the cases the offenders received
milder forms of punishment.44
These and similar results in other studies45 can be
explained by the systematic difficulties hindering the
exact prediction of events with a low base rate: the lower
the base rate, the larger is the rate of false positives, if all
other circumstances are kept equal.46 As serious offences
have a low base rate (the more serious the lower it is),
the prediction of future offences is burdened with the
methodological problem that false positives will inevita-
bly be predicted more often than false negatives. Predic-
tion is, in other words, burdened with a systematic bias
that seems to be unknown to the majority of courts but
42. Jehle et al., above n. 12, at 83.
43. J.L. Müller, ‘Legalbewährung nach Gutachten zur nachträglichen Sicher-
ungsverwahrung’, 94 Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsre-
form 256 (2011).
44. M. Alex, ‘Kriminalprognose und Legalbewährung – Wie zuverlässig lässt
sich Rückfallgefahr vorhersagen?’, in K. Höffler (ed.), Brauchen wir eine
Reform der freiheitsentziehenden Sanktionen? (2015) 21, at 26.
45. Kinzig (2008), above n. 4, at 213 and 217.
46. J. Kühl and K.F. Schumann, ‘Prognosen im Strafrecht – Probleme der
Methodologie und Legitimation’, 7 Recht & Psychiatrie 126 (1989).
that becomes apparent in the results of empirical
research.47 Moreover, it must be noted that the factual
basis of prediction is often quite thin. The future devel-
opment of many of the risk and protective factors con-
sidered relevant by most prediction methods (e.g. rela-
tions to significant others, employment and place of res-
idence) is unknown to courts and expert witnesses at the
time of prediction, so their influence on the convicted
person’s future behaviour can hardly be assessed prop-
erly.48 The consequence is a bitter finding about the
capacity of the principle of proportionality to guide and
control judicial decisions in the field of preventive sanc-
tions: if the prediction of the ‘degree of danger’ (cf. sec.
62 German Criminal Code), which is necessary for the
imposition and execution of these sanctions, is in prac-
tice flawed by the inevitability of systematic errors, the
protective function of the proportionality principle is in
theory remarkably more promising than in practice. The
necessity and the adequacy of (indeterminate) supervi-
sion can in practice easily be misjudged.
4 Alternative (Less Intrusive)
Means
It has already been pointed out that there are no means
in German law that are as suitable as supervision to
achieve the aim of public protection and that are at the
same time less intrusive. Police law interventions are not
necessarily less intrusive than post-release supervision.
Civil law offers no alternatives as well. In 2010, a new
law was enacted in Germany, which provides for the
placement of persons who had to be released from pre-
ventive detention, because the retroactive application of
indefinite post-sentence preventive detention was inter-
preted by the European Court of Human Rights as
amounting to the retroactive imposition of a heavier
penalty incompatible with European human rights
law.49 These persons may be placed in closed institu-
tions if they are considered to be of unsound mind (cf.
Art. 5(1)(e) ECHR) and if there is a high probability
that they will affect the life, personal integrity, freedom
or sexual self-determination of others so that their
placement is considered necessary for public protection
(sec. 1 Therapy and Placement of Mentally Disturbed
Violent Offenders Act). The act was held compatible
with German constitutional law, provided it is interpre-
ted in accordance with the constitution meaning that
there must be a very high risk of further crimes with a
very severe impact on the victims.50 Placement in a
closed institution thus is not a measure less intrusive
than supervision and may therefore not be seen as an
alternative. Neither may the appointment of a custodian
47. Meier, above n. 14, at 372.
48. Alex, above n. 44, at 33.
49. Act on the therapeutic placement of mentally disturbed violent offend-
ers of 22 December 2010, Federal Law Gazette I page 2300.
50. Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 11 July 2013, 2 BvR 2302/11.
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to the convicted person be considered an alternative.
According to German civil law, a custodian may be
appointed if a person by reason of a mental illness or a
physical, mental or psychological handicap cannot take
care of his affairs (sec. 1896 German Civil Code). The
aim of the appointment, however, is not public protec-
tion but the safeguarding of the best interests of the per-
son under custodianship (sec. 1901(2) German Civil
Code). The target groups thus are different; custodian-
ship and supervision have objectives that must be kept
apart clearly.
Against this background, it may come as a surprise that
there are some authors in German academic literature
who are of the opinion that supervision is not compati-
ble with the principle of proportionality.51 They bring
the example of a high-risk offender who is sanctioned
for a violent or a sex offence with imprisonment of, e.g.
two years and placed in preventive detention afterwards.
Because of the high risk of re-offending, the convicted
person will not get an early release after sixteen months
(i.e. two-thirds of twenty-four months), but he will have
to serve the full term of two years (sec. 57(1) German
Criminal Code). Afterwards, he may have to spend up
to ten years in preventive detention (sec. 67d(3) German
Criminal Code), followed by a period of up to five years
during which he will be subject to supervision (sec.
68c(1) German Criminal Code). The convicted person
is thus under the control of the criminal justice authori-
ties for up to seventeen years, although his punishment
was only two years; this is considered disproportionate.
The problem with examples like this is that they obtain
their persuasive power only from the severity of offence
committed in the past, but do not give any information
on the seriousness and likelihood of the future offences.
Because the duration of preventive detention has to be
suspended as soon as it can be expected that the offend-
er will not commit further offences if released (sec.
67d(2) German Criminal Code), the example tacitly
implies that there is still a certain risk of re-offending at
the end of the ten-year period of preventive detention
that excludes an earlier release, but it is, on the other
hand, not sufficient for a prolongation of preventive
detention for more than ten years. The individual risk
may, however, be sufficient to justify the measure of
supervision because supervision is a non-custodial
measure and therefore less intrusive than preventive
detention. With respect to its aim to protect the public
against further offences, there are no surrogates in Ger-
man law capable to achieve the same aim by a smaller
burden on the convicted person’s liberty rights. As a
result, it seems inevitable to accept that, in the given
example, supervision probably is not a disproportionate
means of control.52
51. Ostendorf, above n. 39, pre secs. 68-68g n. 15; see also H. Pollähne,
‘Effektivere Sicherheit der Bevölkerung und schärfere Kontrolle der
Lebensführung’, 90 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und
Rechtsprechung 414 (2007); C. Morgenstern, ‘Neues zur Führungsauf-
sicht’, 18 Neue Kriminalpolitik 153 (2006).
52. Ruderich, above n. 32, at 90.
The example once again shows that the potential of the
principle of proportionality is limited because it does
not provide for the difficulties to predict reliably dan-
gers to the public. Danger and necessity are concepts
that can be described and applied in theory better than
in practice. What remains is unease about a preponder-
ance in public policy of security considerations over lib-
erty rights. In this context, it seems worthwhile to note
that Kinzig and Baur made a highly interesting sugges-
tion that aims at a legislative re-evaluation of the com-
peting interests. The authors recommend a reduction in
the maximum duration of supervision from presently
five years (sec. 68c(1) German Criminal Code) to three
years, which may be extended for two more years if nec-
essary.53 As the diverging interests at hand, public pro-
tection as well as liberty rights, are provided for by this
suggestion in a balanced and responsible way, it cannot
be excluded that the proposition might be taken up by
German public policy.
5 The Human Rights
Perspective
The compromise between public security and individual
liberty rights that defines the convicted person’s legal
position in Germany today is only indirectly influenced
by the European human rights perspective. The Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court ruled in its judge-
ment of 4 May 2011 that the European Convention on
Human Rights does not rank higher or on the same level
as German constitutional law but that it ranks below the
constitution and has only the legal force of ordinary fed-
eral law.54 A violation of European human rights can
therefore not be contested by an appeal to the German
Constitutional Court. The German constitution, i.e. the
Basic Law, is nevertheless considered as open and
friendly to international law. ‘Friendly’ means that the
constitution has to be interpreted in light of the Europe-
an Convention and the European Court’s judgements as
long as this does not lead to a weakening of the standard
of protection of the basic rights according to the consti-
tution. The German Constitutional Court identified as
one of the examples for such a weakening the so-called
multipolar settings involving more than one affected
party, where the rights involved needed to be carefully
balanced against each other and where more protection
given to one party would inevitably imply less protec-
tion for the other.55 According to the Constitutional
Court, the principle of proportionality is the preferential
method to incorporate the European Court’s delibera-
tions into national law.
53. Baur and Kinzig, above n. 38, at 592.
54. Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 4 May 2011, 2 BvR 2365/09,
n. 83.
55. Ibid., n. 93; B. Peters, ‘Germany’s Dialogue with Strasbourg: Extrapolat-
ing the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Relationship with the European
Court of Human Rights in the Preventive Detention Decision’, 13 Ger-
man Law Journal 182 (2012).
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In the 1980s, the German Constitutional Court ruled
that supervision imposed by law as an automatic conse-
quence of release after two years of imprisonment was
consistent with the principle of proportionality.56 In
those days, the European Convention was not paid
much attention to by the German judiciary, though, and
the duration of supervision was limited to a maximum
of five years. The question thus arises as to whether the
law which was expanded in 1998 and 2007 with the
option of indeterminate supervision is still in accordance
with European fundamental rights, even if these only
indirectly influence the interpretation and practice of
German national law.
For such a re-examination, it is necessary to decide in
the first step whether supervision is a form of depriva-
tion of the convicted person’s liberty or whether it is
just a restriction of liberty. From the German perspec-
tive, the distinction may seem to be only of minor
importance because the specific safeguards for depriva-
tion of liberty in Article 104 Basic Law (namely formal
law and judicial order) are undoubtedly met, but Article
5 ECHR constitutes additional safeguards, which must
be met if deprivation of liberty is under scrutiny.57 In
the Guzzardi case, the European Court specified some
of the criteria relevant to the distinction between depri-
vation and restriction of liberty, above all type, duration,
effects and manner of implementation of the particular
measure.58 Of these, duration is a criterion that might
give cause to classify supervision as deprivation of liber-
ty, because the preventive measure may in exceptional
cases last for life, while all other criteria suggest that the
convicted person is not deprived of but only restricted
in his liberty. The duration of a measure alone, howev-
er, may hardly be sufficient to exclusively decide on the
appropriate classification of the measure, rather it seems
necessary to make an overall assessment of the given cri-
teria. Such an overall assessment would focus on the
function of the measure and emphasise the fact that
supervision serves as a non-custodial means in the tran-
sition process between custody and unrestricted liberty.
From the functional point of view, supervision as an
abstract sanction category should therefore rather be
classified as merely a restrictive measure, which would
have the consequence that the safeguards of Article 5
ECHR do not apply.
A different evaluation might come to mind if supervi-
sion is seen in connection with particular directions by
which the offender is de facto prevented from leaving
certain places or areas, e.g. the direction to carry the
equipment for electronic monitoring and not leave
home.59 If these cases are judged as deprivation of liber-
ty, they have to comply with the safeguards of the Con-
vention, i.e. the direction must be considered either as a
consequence of the earlier conviction (Art. 5(1)a ECHR)
56. Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 15 August 1980, 2 BvR
495/80, n. 6.
57. R. Esser, Löwe-Rosenberg. Die Strafprozessordnung und das Gerichts-
verfassungsgesetz, 26th edn (2012), EMRK Art. 5 n. 24.
58. ECtHR, Guzzardi v. Italy, Applic. No. 7367/76, n. 92.
59. Cf. Esser, above n. 57, EMRK Art. 5 n. 27.
or as necessary to prevent the convicted person from
committing further offences (Art. 5(1)c ECHR). Both
options have their own disadvantages. In the first case, it
seems doubtful whether there is a ‘sufficient causal con-
nection between the conviction and the deprivation of
liberty at issue’,60 and in the second case, it is doubtful
whether the potential further offences are ‘sufficiently
concrete and specific’.61 So far, the problem has not
been discussed in Germany.62 Nevertheless, it can be
assumed that the connection between the conviction and
the said directions probably is sufficient enough to com-
ply with the Convention. In those cases in which super-
vision is the automatic consequence of release from pris-
on or a custodial preventive measure, the courts’ subse-
quent decisions are predetermined by law; they are
dependent on the earlier conviction and the determina-
tion of the concrete form of punishment.
If supervision is considered a restriction of liberty,
another fundamental right comes into view that is guar-
anteed in German national law as well as in European
law: the right not to be punished twice (Art. 103(3)
Basic Law, Art. 4 ECHR Protocol No. 7). In most cases,
preventive supervision emerges as a criminal sanction at
a time when the primary sanction (imprisonment and/
or a custodial preventive measure) has been executed
and the convicted person expects to regain unrestricted
liberty. From the released offender’s point of view, it
can be presumed that the period of guidance and control
that follows, if he is under supervision, has the appear-
ance of a second punishment. Nevertheless, technically
a violation of the basic right not to be punished twice
must be rejected, first because supervision is not consid-
ered a form of punishment in Germany (but a preven-
tive measure), and second because it is not construed as
an independent judgement, but as a legal, i.e. automatic
consequence of the conviction. The judicial decisions
that follow after release (e.g. on the duration of supervi-
sion, the directions and the cooperation of the institu-
tions) modify the execution of supervision, they are sub-
sequent decisions, but they are not a second punishment
for the offence.63 Neither does supervision, by the way,
violate the right that there must be no punishment with-
out law (Art. 103(2) Basic Law, Art. 7(1) ECHR)
because the specific consequences of supervision are laid
down in the Criminal Code and are part of the legal
framework that establishes the consequences of the con-
viction, from the duty to bear the costs of the proceed-
ings to the entry of the conviction and other particulars
in the federal central criminal register. If the European
Court ruled in the Kafkaris case that the term ‘law’
implies qualitative requirements, including those of
60. ECtHR, Haidn v. Germany, Applic. No. 6587/04, n. 75.
61. ECtHR, M. v. Germany, Applic. No. 19359/04, n. 102; Haidn v. Germa-
ny, Applic. No. 6587/04, n. 90.
62. Cf. H.-U. Paeffgen, Systematischer Kommentar zur Strafprozessord-
nung, 4th edn (2012), EMRK Art. 5 n. 33c.
63. Nuremberg Higher Regional Court, 10 November 2014, 2 Ws 509/14,
n. 17.
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accessibility and foreseeability,64 these requirements are
met by German law beyond doubt.
Thus in the end, it is the general principle of propor-
tionality, again, which has to be examined, because in
German legal thinking any measure by state authorities
that is an interference with the general freedom of
action granted by German constitutional law (Art. 2(1)
Basic Law) must comply with the rule of law principle
of which the proportionality of the measure is an inte-
gral part. It has already been pointed out that the Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court ruled as early as 1980
that preventive supervision is fully consistent with the
principle of proportionality because it may be applied
only in those cases in which further offences are expec-
ted. The flexibility of the principle, which is a conse-
quence of the open and unspecified notions used in its
construction (‘necessary’, ‘adequate’), however, leaves
little room for a speculation that how the Constitutional
Court would evaluate indeterminate supervision today if
the case were brought forward. Neither can it be expec-
ted that the European human rights perspective would
bring a change because the convicted person’s individu-
al rights would still have to be balanced against public
security interests. It is highly probable that the Consti-
tutional Court would reaffirm its earlier decision and
hold that supervision is still in accordance with the fun-
damental rights laid down in the German constitution
and the European Convention.
This finding may seem somewhat disillusioning, but it
should be noted that it refers to supervision as only an
abstract sanction category, defined by law. It does not
refer to the execution of supervision in particular cases,
especially to the legitimacy of certain subsequent deci-
sions on the directions imposed on the convicted
offender after release. The Dresden Higher Regional
Court, for instance, recently found that a direction to
take up residence at a specific place prescribed by the
competent division of the regional court was not cov-
ered by the German Criminal Code and was a violation
of the released person’s freedom of movement (Art.
11(1) Basic Law, Article 2(1) ECHR Protocol No. 4).65
In Germany, freedom of movement may only be restric-
ted in the way that the convicted person is directed not
to leave his place of domicile or a specified area without
the permission of the supervising authority (sec. 68b(1)
No. 1 German Criminal Code). In the same way, the
Dresden Court found that the direction to make an
effort to find employment immediately after release is a
violation of the released person’s occupational freedom
(Art. 12(1) Basic Law, Art. 15 Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union).66 He may only be direc-
ted to report to an employment agency (sec. 68b(1) No.
9 German Criminal Code), but he is not obliged to
accept any employment offered to him by the agency.67
The Federal Constitutional Court, too, had to decide
64. ECtHR, Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Applic. No. 21906/04, n. 140.
65. Dresden Higher Regional Court, 5 June 2015, 2 Ws 248/15, n. 16.
66. Ibid., n. 22.
67. Groß, above n. 26, sec. 68b n. 26; Kinzig (2014), above n. 26, sec. 68b
n. 14.
several cases in which individual rights had to be bal-
anced against public security interests. In the beginning
of 2015, it found in an interim decision that the direc-
tion to carry the equipment for electronic monitoring
(sec. 68b(1) No. 12 German Criminal Code) is a restric-
tion of the offender’s freedom of action (Art. 2(1) Basic
Law), which may be demanded of him until the court
finally decides on the case.68 On the other hand, some
years earlier, it ruled that the direction not to publish
right-wing ideas for a period of five years after release
(sec. 68b(1) No. 4 German Criminal Code) was a dis-
proportionate interference with the offender’s freedom
of expression (Art. 5(1) Basic Law, Art. 10(1) ECHR).69
Summing up, it must be concluded that the human
rights perspective certainly plays a role in German judi-
cature, but that this role is revealed mainly in connec-
tion with the execution of supervision, not in connection
with its imposition by law or its function as an abstract
sanction category.
6 Conclusion
The indeterminate control of ‘dangerous’ offenders in
the community is in Germany provided for by the pre-
ventive measure of supervision. Supervision is a combi-
nation of control and social support that starts off when
a convicted person is released from prison or a custodial
preventive measure. Regularly the period of supervision
lasts for five years, but it can be shortened as well as
extended to indeterminate supervision. In addition,
supervision can be combined with directions given to
the convicted person to influence his conduct of life and
make sure that no further offences are committed. As a
result of the legal developments since 1998, the con-
straints for the imposition and execution of supervision
are lower in the case of convicted sex offenders than
they are in other cases. While supervision is regularly
put into operation, if a convicted person is released from
prison after having fully served for at least two years, it
is only one year in the case of sex offenders (sec. 68f(1)
German Criminal Code). While the requirements for
indeterminate supervision are generally quite strict (sec.
68c(2) and (3) German Criminal Code), the period of
supervision may be extended for life in the case of con-
victed sex offenders (and a second, very small group of
offenders) if the offender has been sentenced to two
years of imprisonment and after release either violates a
direction or ‘other specific circumstances give reason to
believe that there may be a danger to the general public
by the commission of further serious offences’ (sec.
68c(3) No. 2 German Criminal Code). This gives the
courts a wide discretion. Against this background one
might say that in Germany, too, the legal position of
convicted sex offenders is quite exceptional.
68. Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 22 January 2015, 2 BvR
2095/14, n. 17.
69. Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 8 December 2010, 1 BvR
1106/08.
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While in the vast majority of cases supervision is
imposed by law in Germany, i.e. it is the automatic,
legal consequence of release from specified custodial
sanctions, the execution of supervision with respect to
duration and directions is mainly governed by the prin-
ciple of proportionality. Suitability, necessity and ade-
quacy are the criteria that are of overall importance in
this context. All restrictions imposed upon the convic-
ted person are justified if, and to the degree that, they
are suitable, necessary and adequate to achieve the aim
of public protection, i.e. to prevent the convicted person
from committing further offences. The central legal
constraint of proportionality is thus dependent on the
validity and reliability of the predictions about the
offender’s future criminal conduct, which is in its
essence an empirically based statement built on the find-
ings of criminological research. Its reliance on the accu-
racy of empirical prediction methods delimits the pro-
tective function of the proportionality principle to guide
and control judicial decisions in the field of preventive
sanctions. What is expected by the law, clear and unam-
biguous assessments on the likelihood and the serious-
ness of future offences, can, however, hardly be provi-
ded for in practice, neither by the courts nor by psychi-
atric, psychological or criminological expert witnesses.
The consequence is in practice a somewhat cloudy mix-
ture of non-distinctive considerations that are flawed by
a systematic bias in that they overestimate the risk of re-
offending. On the long run, this situation can only be
changed by two developments: a clearer distinction
between the different target groups of supervision and
their differential risks on the side of the courts, and on
the side of the experts more empirical research aiming at
the further improvement of the validity and accuracy of
the prediction methods. The conflict between public
security and individual liberty rights, which is in the
background of the imposition and the execution of
supervision, can only be solved adequately by empirical-
ly based, value-oriented judgements of the courts,
assigning the diverging interests their due weight.
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